Little is known about the neurobiological mechanisms underlying prosocial decisions and how they are modulated by social factors such as perceived group membership. The present study investigates the neural processes preceding the willingness to engage in costly helping toward ingroup and outgroup members. Soccer fans witnessed a fan of their favorite team (ingroup member) or of a rival team (outgroup member) experience pain. They were subsequently able to choose to help the other by enduring physical pain themselves to reduce the other's pain. Helping the ingroup member was best predicted by anterior insula activation when seeing him suffer and by associated self-reports of empathic concern. In contrast, not helping the outgroup member was best predicted by nucleus accumbens activation and the degree of negative evaluation of the other. We conclude that empathy-related insula activation can motivate costly helping, whereas an antagonistic signal in nucleus accumbens reduces the propensity to help.
INTRODUCTION
For centuries, the question of whether human nature is fundamentally good or bad has been at the heart of controversial debates in philosophy, politics, and science. Behavioral social science research has investigated the conditions under which people behave in a prosocial manner (reviewed in Dovidio et al., 2006; Penner et al., 2005) . However, very little is known about the neurobiological mechanisms underlying prosocial decisions and how they are modulated by social factors such as perceived group membership.
One intriguing outcome of behavioral social science work is the claim that an altruistic motivation, directed toward the ultimate goal of increasing the welfare of a person in need, is evoked by empathy, also known as the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson, 1991) . Moreover, a number of studies have investigated whether and how prosocial behavior is affected by social factors such as group membership (Levine et al., 2005; Stü rmer et al., 2005 Stü rmer et al., , 2006 . The empirical evidence is mixed. Some studies have shown that people are more likely to help an ingroup member than an outgroup member in similar need (e.g., Levine et al., 2005) , referred to as ''parochial altruism' ' (De Dreu et al., 2010) . However, other studies did not find reliable differences in helping across groups (e.g., Stü rmer et al., 2006) . One possible explanation for these inconsistent results is that the decision to help is not only influenced by group membership, but also by the potential helper's attitude toward the ingroup or outgroup member. A positive evaluation of the other has been found to increase expressed empathic concern, which should increase the likelihood of helping to relieve the empathyinducing need (Batson et al., 2007; Coke et al., 1978; Dovidio et al., 1990) . Ingroup members tend to be evaluated more positively than outgroup members, which should lead to higher empathic concern for their suffering and increase the motivation to help. In contrast, the more negative evaluation of outgroup members should result in less empathic concern, decreasing helping motivation. Consistent with the findings of Lanzetta and Englis (1989) , subjects may even take pleasure in the outgroup member's suffering. However, if an outgroup member is evaluated positively, ''parochial altruism'' should be undermined. Taken together, there is a large body of behavioral work focusing on the empathy-altruism hypothesis, and inconsistent findings regarding models of parochial altruism. However, the neural factors associated with prosocial decisions and their modulation by perceived group membership have not yet been investigated.
Recent fMRI studies in social neuroscience have started to identify brain networks involved in empathy and their modulation (for reviews, see Decety and Lamm, 2006; Hein and Singer, 2008; Singer and Lamm, 2009) . Most of these studies have focused on measuring brain signals elicited when participants are observing other people suffering pain (Akitsuki and Decety, 2009; Benuzzi et al., 2008; Cheng et al., 2007; Lamm et al., 2007a Lamm et al., , 2007b Saarela et al., 2007; Singer et al., 2004 Singer et al., , 2006 Singer et al., , 2008 . The comparison of brain activation elicited in participants experiencing pain and that elicited when they merely observe others experiencing pain showed shared activations in affective regions of the pain matrix, that is, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and anterior insula (AI), which were related to self-reported measures of empathy (reviewed in Singer and Lamm, 2009 ). Furthermore, several recent studies have focused on identifying factors that modulate these empathy-related brain responses (Bird et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 2007; Lamm et al., 2007a; Singer et al., 2006) . Contextual appraisal of the situation (Lamm et al., 2007a) and person characteristics such as alexithymia (a deficit in understanding one's own emotions; Bird et al., 2009 ) and experience with pain (Cheng et al., 2007) have been found to modulate empathy-related brain responses in AI and ACC. Particularly relevant for the current study, Singer et al. (2006) found that male participants who perceived the suffering person as being unfair in a monetary exchange game showed nucleus accumbens (NAcc) activation associated with their expressed desire for revenge instead of AI activation related to empathy, suggesting that two antagonistic motivational systems compete with each other. However, it is unknown whether this observed brain activation pattern can be extended to another domain such as perceived group membership of others and how these antagonistic brain signals relate to actual behavior, such as engagement in prosocial behavior. Here, we investigate whether brain responses elicited by witnessing another suffering pain are modulated by perceived group membership and how these brain responses are related to the prediction of costly helping-or a lack of helping-toward ingroup and outgroup members.
More specifically, we hypothesized that individual differences in empathy-related brain activation in AI and ACC elicited when witnessing another suffering pain should predict differences in subsequent costly helping. Specifically, ingroup favoritism in helping should be linked to the difference in empathy-related brain responses when viewing an ingroup versus outgroup member in pain. Based on previous findings (Singer et al., 2006) , we further predicted a reduction in empathy-related brain responses in the core empathy-related network and an increase in NAcc activation when participants see an outgroup instead of an ingroup member in pain. Furthermore, participants who see the outgroup member suffering pain and show activation in NAcc instead of empathy-related brain regions should show a decreased tendency to help the outgroup member later on. Finally, we aimed to compare the relative contributions of self-reports and brain measures to the prediction of helping the ingroup and outgroup members.
RESULTS
To test these predictions, we used a natural group manipulation (fans of different soccer teams) and an fMRI paradigm to assess brain responses to others' suffering and costly helping. We recruited male fans of the local soccer team who were paired with a fellow fan of the same team (''ingroup confederate''). Both men received wristbands in the team color and with the emblem of the local team and met two fans of the local team's rival (''outgroup confederates''), wearing wristbands in the team color and with the emblem of the local team's rival. The two pairs played a competitive soccer quiz game against each other. The experimenter made sure that the ingroup pair always won to prompt uniform positive mood.
Before entering the scanner, the participant and confederates completed the Sport Spectator Identification Scale (SSIS; Wann and Branscombe, 1993) , measuring their identification with their soccer team, and an Impression Scale (modified from Batson et al., 1988) , on which they separately rated their impression of the ingroup member and the outgroup members (see Experimental Procedures and Supplemental Information available online for details).
In Session 1 of the fMRI experiment, we measured participants' brain responses while they received highly, moderately, or mildly painful shocks through electrodes on the backs of their hands or while they observed the ingroup or an outgroup member, sitting on either side of the scanner, receive painful shocks (Singer et al., 2006) . The recipient of pain (self, ingroup, outgroup) and the intensity of the impending shock were indicated by visual cues ( Figure 1A ). While being scanned, participants rated how they felt receiving high, medium, or low pain themselves, or observing it in the ingroup and outgroup member, on a rating scale (À4, very bad, to 4, very good).
In an independent Session 2, the participant being scanned again observed the ingroup and outgroup member in pain. However, this time he was not receiving painful stimulation himself, but was to select one of three possible courses of action ( Figure 1B) . One option was to help the ingroup or outgroup member by volunteering to receive half of that person's pain himself, thus reducing the intensity of that person's pain stimulation by half (''Help'' option). Such helping behavior was costly for the participant because it resulted in a painful shock. The second option was to not help, but to watch a soccer video instead, while the other suffered pain (''Watch Video'' option). This option offered an attractive alternative to helping and distraction from watching the pain administration. The third option was to not help, but to watch the other person suffering pain (''Watch Pain'' option).
After scanning, the participants completed an Empathic Concern Scale, a measure of situational empathy (Batson et al., 1997) , separately assessing how they felt when observing the ingroup member and the outgroup member suffering pain (see Experimental Procedures and Supplemental Appendix for details).
Questionnaires SSIS All participants filled in the name of the local soccer team as their favorite sports team and reported high scores of identification with their team, M = 6.3 (on a Likert scale, ranging from 1, low identification, to 8, high identification).
Impression Scale
We used the Wilcoxon signed rank test to test for differences in the average ratings for the ingroup member and the outgroup member. Confirming the success of the group manipulation, the average ratings for the ingroup member (M = 3.7, SE = 0.2) on the Impression Scale (Batson et al., 1988) were significantly more positive than for the outgroup member (M = 6.0, SE = 1.3, Likert scale from 1 [very much] to 9 [not at all], z = À3.4, p = 0.001 [ Figure S1A available online]).
Empathic Concern Scale
We submitted the average ratings on the Empathic Concern Scale (Batson et al., 1997) for the ingroup and the outgroup member to a Wilcoxon signed rank test. The results showed significantly more self-reported empathy for the ingroup member (M = 3.6, SE = 0.2) than for the outgroup member (M = 3, SE = 0.3) in pain (z = À2.2, p = 0.025). Ratings of Self and Others' Pain in the Scanning Session 1 We only analyzed the data of 14 participants because 2 participants did not provide complete ratings. Confirming the results of the Empathic Concern Scale, the high pain of the outgroup member was rated significantly less negative than the high pain of the ingroup member (Wilcoxon signed rank tests, z = À2.7, p = 0.006). For self and the ingroup member, high pain stimulation was rated as significantly more aversive than medium pain stimulation, and medium pain stimulation significantly more aversive than low pain stimulation (self highmedium: z = À2.1, p = 0.002; medium-low: z = À3.5, p < 0.001; ingroup high-medium: z = À3.4, p = 0.001; medium-low: z = À3.3, p = 0.001). Pain ratings for the outgroup member showed a significant difference between medium and low (z = À2.3, p = 0.021), but not between high and medium pain (z < 1) ( Figure S1B ).
Behavioral Results of the fMRI Session 2
The behavioral data of fMRI Session 2 were submitted to Wilcoxon signed rank tests. The results showed that participants indeed opted to endure pain themselves in order to help the other person, but more so for the ingroup (M = 65.7%, SE = 6.7) than for the outgroup member (M = 45.5%, SE = 7.1; z = À3.2, p = 0.001). There was no group effect regarding the Watch Video option (ingroup M = 26%, SE = 5.8; outgroup M = 30.6%, SE = 6.5; z = À1.4, p = 0.15). Participants watched the outgroup member (M = 23.6%, SE = 6.8) receive pain more frequently than they watched the ingroup member receive pain (M = 8%, SE = 3.7; z = À2.8, p = 0.005) ( Figure 1C) . However, the Watch Pain option was chosen only by 9 of our 16 participants, with an average of four trials. Therefore, this option was not subjected to further analyses.
Our repeated trial design necessary for fMRI studies might have led to comparisons across trials regarding the frequency of ingroup and outgroup helping. As a consequence, participants might have felt some obligation to help, in particular to increase the frequency of outgroup helping. A potential feeling of obligation should have built up with an increasing number of comparisons across trials, reflected in differences between people's helping behavior at the beginning and at the end of the session. To test this assumption, we calculated the frequency with which the participant helped the outgroup member in the first half of Session 2 (i.e., the first nine trials per participant) and in the second half of Session 2 (i.e., the last nine trials per participant). We then calculated the frequency of helping across all 16 participants in the two session halves and 
fMRI Results
To analyze the link between neural responses when observing the other's suffering in Session 1, and helping behavior in Session 2, we used a region of interest (ROI) approach, following the guideline for independent ROI analyses (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009) . A meta-analysis of three independent fMRI studies using a similar paradigm as in Session 1 with male participants (Bird et al., 2009; Singer et al., 2006 Singer et al., , 2008 provided nine ROIs including bilateral insula and ACC (see Table S5 for a list of all nine ROIs with center coordinates). For each participant we extracted the beta values averaged over all voxels of each of the nine ROIs. In addition, we conducted whole-brain multiple regression analyses, corrected for multiple comparisons across all nine ROIs ( Figure S2 ). Finally, we also performed whole-brain analyses (Experimental Procedures, Tables S1-S4 ).
First, we tested the link between brain responses when observing suffering of ingroup or outgroup members in Session 1 and helping in Session 2 collapsed across groups. Individual activation in the left AI when seeing others' suffering in Session 1 (i.e., the contrast between high versus low pain trials, pooled across the ingroup and outgroup conditions) predicted the total number of trials in which people chose to help [r(16) = 0.57, p = 0.019], and correlated negatively with the number of trials in which participants opted to watch the video instead of helping [r(16) = À0.59, p = 0.015]. These results confirm our hypothesis that the magnitude of responses in left AI when witnessing another person suffering pain predicts participants' tendency to engage in costly helping later on. Moreover, individual differences in left AI activation correlated significantly with individual differences in empathic concern expressed on the Empathic Concern Scale (Batson et al., 1997 ) (r(16) = 0.52, p = 0.042), indicating that brain responses observed in AI during the empathy condition are indeed linked to self-reported feelings of empathic concern. No significant correlations were observed in the other ROIs (Table S5 ). Complementary whole-brain regression analysis confirmed that left AI was the only brain region showing significant correlation with helping behavior and selfreported empathic concern ( Figure S2 ). Conjunction analyses between self pain and other pain further replicate previous findings of shared activation in left AI elicited both when processing nociceptive stimuli in self and when empathizing with the pain of others (Tables S2 and S4 ; for the contrast between high versus low self-pain and the brain region parametrically modulated by high, medium, and low pain stimulation; see Table S1 ).
Next, we tested for differences in brain responses when participants observed the ingroup versus outgroup member in pain, and assessed the relationship of these differences to ingroup favoritism in helping behavior. The group-averaged activation in left AI was stronger when participants saw high versus low pain in the ingroup member (high -low ingroup pain) as compared with high versus low pain in the outgroup member [high -low outgroup pain; t(15) = 2.9, p = 0.009; Figure 2A ], reflecting an ingroup bias in empathy-related AI brain responses. Interestingly, the individual ingroup À outgroup difference in left AI responses (high -low ingroup pain versus high -low outgroup pain contrast) predicted the extent of participants' ingroup favoritism in subsequent costly helping (r(16) = 0.53, p = 0.037; Figure 2B ). The stronger participants' AI responses to ingroup (1) individual parameter estimates extracted from the independent ROI in left AI when subjects witnessed high versus low pain in the ingroup member and high versus low pain in the outgroup member in Session 1, and (2) individual differences in helping the ingroup compared to the outgroup member (in relation to the total frequency of helping) in Session 2. IG, ingroup; OG, outgroup.
pain relative to outgroup pain in Session 1, the more they helped the ingroup member, but not the outgroup member, in Session 2. Equivalent analyses in the other ROIs revealed no significant results (Table S5) . Complementary whole-brain analyses confirmed the significant difference between ingroup and outgroup pain in left AI, but not in other ROIs (Table S3) .
Further, we hypothesized that people might show increased NAcc activation when they observe outgroup versus ingroup pain. To test this prediction, we aimed to analyze NAcc activation in independent ROIs, unbiased by lateralization. To do so, we first used the ROIs provided in an independent previous paper by Knutson et al. (2008) because they allow us to define ROIs in bilateral NAcc, in contrast to other relevant studies that only reported unilateral NAcc activation (Singer et al., 2006; Takahashi et al., 2009) . From these ROIs in bilateral NAcc (Knutson et al., 2008) , we extracted activations for high -low outgroup Differences Both on a Self-Report Impression Scale and in Outgroup Helping (A) Correlation between individual parameter estimates extracted from an independent ROI in right NAcc when subjects witnessed high versus low pain in the outgroup member in Session 1, and individual differences in outgroup ratings on the Impression Scale (Batson et al., 1988) . (B) Correlation between individual parameter estimates extracted from the independent ROI in left AI when subjects witnessed high versus low pain in the outgroup member in Session 1, and individual differences in outgroup ratings on the Impression Scale. (C) Correlation between individual parameter estimates extracted from an independent ROI in right NAcc when subjects witnessed high versus low pain in the outgroup member in Session 1, and individual differences in the frequency of outgroup helping in Session 2. Based on previous social science models stressing the important role of subjective evaluation (Batson et al., 2007) , we tested the possibility that the lack of observed main effect in NAcc was driven by individual differences in outgroup impression cancelling each other out on group average. For this, we computed an additional analysis correlating individual differences in NAcc activation for high -low pain (ingroup; outgroup) with people's subjective ratings on the Impression Scale (Batson et al., 1988) . And indeed, for the outgroup condition, the results showed a significant correlation in right NAcc: the more negative the participants' impression of the outgroup member, the stronger participants' brain signal in right NAcc when seeing the outgroup member in pain [r(16) = 0.51, p = 0.04; Figure 3A ]. There was no significant correlation between ingroup impression ratings and high -low ingroup pain [r(16) = À0.19, p = 0.47, significantly different from the outgroup correlation, ANCOVA, F(1,28) = 5.1, p = 0.031]. This reflects invariably positive impression ratings for the ingroup member and a general lack of NAcc activation when observing an ingroup member suffering pain.
An equivalent analysis in the left AI revealed that a negative impression of the outgroup member was also linked to a decrease in activation in left AI when seeing the outgroup member in pain [r(16) = À0.54, p = 0.03; Figure 3B ]. Taken together, these results indicate that individual NAcc activation and the strength of empathy-related AI responses when participants saw an outgroup member in pain were modulated by their impression of the outgroup member. Again, there were no such significant correlations in any of the other ROIs (Table S5) . Moreover, there was no significant correlation between the impression ratings of the ingroup member and left AI activation for ingroup pain [r(16) = À0.04, p = 0.9].
To test whether NAcc activation in Session 1 predicts outgroup helping in Session 2, we computed a correlation between individual beta values of high -low outgroup pain activation from bilateral ROIs in the NAcc and the frequency of helping the outgroup member. In line with our prediction, we observed a negative correlation between individual right NAcc activation in Session 1 and subsequent outgroup helping; the stronger a subject's activation in right NAcc when observing suffering in the outgroup member, the less likely he was to help him [r(16) = À0.59, p = 0.016; Figure 3C ]. There was no significant correlation in left NAcc [r(16) = À0.10, p = 0.69].
In complementary analyses, we tested the robustness of effects found in right NAcc using different ROIs taken from two other independent studies (Singer et al., 2006; Takahashi et al., 2009 ; see Experimental Procedures for details). Confirming the results of our main analysis with the ''Knutson ROIs,'' we found a significant negative correlation between right NAcc activation when participants were observing the outgroup member in pain in Session 1 and helping the outgroup member in Session 2 [ROI from Singer et al. (2006) These results show that we were able to replicate our NAcc results in ROIs from three different independent studies, which reflects their robustness.
In a final integrative step, we sought to compare the relative contributions of assessed self-report and brain activation measures to the prediction of costly helping in the ingroup and the outgroup condition. To this end, we conducted commonality analyses to assess the unique and common variance contributions of neural predictors (activation in AI and NAcc) and self-report predictors (Empathic Concern Scale and Impression Scale) to explained variance in helping toward the ingroup and the outgroup member (see Experimental Procedures for details).
Helping the ingroup member was best predicted by the unique contribution of left AI activation when the participant saw the ingroup member in pain (U1 = 0.225 = 22.5% of the variance in ingroup helping) the unique contribution of the rating on the Empathic Concern Scale for the ingroup member (U3 = 0.164 = 16.4% of the variance in ingroup helping; both p < 0.05), and the shared variance of these two measures (C13 = 0.117 = 11.7% of the variance in ingroup helping; p < 0.1; Table 1 ). There were no significant differences in the size of the contribution of these components (p > 0.05, value corresponding to the 95% confidence interval of the bootstrapping distribution, Figure S3A ).
In contrast, significant predictors for helping the outgroup member were the unique contribution of NAcc activation when the participant saw the outgroup member in pain (U2 = 0.243 = 24.3% of the variance in outgroup helping), the shared contribution of NAcc activation and the ratings on the Impression Scale for the outgroup member (C24 = 0.17 = 17% of the variance in outgroup helping; both p < 0.05), and the unique contribution of the rating on the Impression Scale (U4 = 0.102 = 10.2% of the variance in outgroup helping; p < 0.1; Table  1 ). No other contributions were significant (Empathic Concern Scale and Impression Scale, p > 0.1; all others, p > 0.3; Figure S3B ). The unique contribution of NAcc activation was significantly greater than that of the Impression Scale (p < 0.05), suggesting that people's brain responses in NAcc were better predictors of their future outgroup behavior than their Numbers refer to unique (U) and common (C) contributions in explaining variance in ingroup helping and outgroup helping. Predictors are (1) activation in AI, (2) activation in NAcc elicited when subjects see an ingroup member/outgroup member in pain, (3) self-reported empathy for ingroup member/outgroup member on the Empathic Concern Scale, and (4) selfreported impression of ingroup member/ outgroup member on the Impression Scale. Significant contributions are shown in bold.
self-reported measures of outgroup impression (value corresponding to the 95% confidence interval of the bootstrapping distribution, D = 0.14, NAcc versus Impression scale, D = 0.15; NAcc versus NAcc + Impression Scale, D = 0.07; Impression Scale versus NAcc + Impression Scale, D = 0.072; Experimental Procedures for details).
DISCUSSION
The goal of our study was to investigate the neurobiological basis of prosocial behavior; more specifically, the decision to help an ingroup or outgroup member suffering pain. We hypothesized that empathy-related brain activation when witnessing others' suffering pain would predict subsequent helping behavior, and that such empathy-related responses would mediate the effect of group membership on helping. Further, we predicted that participants would show a decreased tendency to help if they responded with NAcc activation instead of empathy-related activation to others' suffering. Finally, we aimed to determine the relative contributions of brain responses and self-report measures to the prediction of later helping behavior toward the ingroup or outgroup member.
Confirming previous results in empathy-for-pain research (for reviews, see Decety and Lamm, 2006; Hein and Singer, 2008; Singer and Lamm, 2009 ), both our ROI and our whole-brain analyses revealed enhanced activation in AI when participants witnessed others' pain. In line with previous studies reporting correlations between observed activation in AI and subjective affective ratings (Akitsuki and Decety, 2009; Benuzzi et al., 2008; Cheng et al., 2007; Lamm et al., 2007a; Saarela et al., 2007; Singer et al., 2008) , activation in AI was significantly correlated with subjective state measures of felt empathic concern assessed postscan with the Empathic Concern Scale (Batson et al., 1997) . This result is in line with previous social psychological models claiming that empathic concern, that is, feeling for another, motivates helping, in contrast to the so-called feeling of empathic distress or personal distress, which is an aversive and self-oriented emotional response to the suffering of others that often results in withdrawal behavior motivated by the desire to protect oneself from negative emotions (Batson et al., 1983; Eisenberg et al., 1989) .
In contrast to other fMRI studies focusing on empathy for pain, empathy-related activation in the present study was observed in left AI only. The lateralization of empathy-related brain activation was addressed in a recent paper that analyzed activations in 168 participants from nine different empathy-for-pain studies (Lamm and Singer, 2010) . Formal tests of asymmetry based on lateralization indices did not reveal hemispheric asymmetry. However, in line with our results, inspection of the thresholded statistical parametric maps showed stronger activation in left fronto-insular cortex.
More importantly, our results showed stronger brain responses in left AI when participants witnessed an ingroup member as compared with an outgroup member suffering pain. This finding suggests an ingroup bias in empathy-related brain responses in the anterior insular cortex, which extends previous studies on empathy modulation (Cheng et Hein and Singer, 2008) as well as previous studies investigating the impact of group membership on neural correlates of fear (Olsson et al., 2005) and face processing (Golby et al., 2001; Lieberman et al., 2005; Van Bavel et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2009 ). Furthermore, we found that witnessing an outgroup member suffering pain elicited activation in right NAcc along with a decrease in empathy-related activation in left AI. NAcc is known to receive major projection from ascending dopaminergic pathways, which are long known to be crucial for reward processing (Schultz, 1986 (Schultz, , 2000 (Schultz, , 2002 . In social contexts, NAcc activation has also been observed when people derive pleasure from the misfortune of others (Singer et al., 2006; Takahashi et al., 2009 ). In the context of these findings, the NAcc activation in our study might imply that watching a negatively evaluated outgroup member receiving pain was processed in a reward-related manner.
Extending previous results showing average enhanced NAcc activation in males witnessing pain in people who behaved unfairly in a monetary exchange game (Singer et al., 2006) , we show here that NAcc activation is mediated by participants' social evaluation of the other person. In other words, the simple fact that a person is an outgroup member was not sufficient to elicit NAcc activation in all subjects while they observed him suffering pain. In order to activate NAcc, the observer needed to have a strong enough negative impression of the suffering person. This observation may also help to explain the mixed findings of behavioral studies investigating parochial altruism: Sometimes people have indeed been found to be more likely to help an ingroup than an outgroup member in similar need (e.g., Levine et al., 2005) . However, other times no such differences could be observed (e.g., Stü rmer et al., 2006) . Our findings suggest that the decision to help may not only be determined by perceived group membership; it might also be influenced by the potential helper's attitude toward the ingroup or outgroup member (see also Batson et al., 2007) . If the only information one has about a person in need is group membership, as in the research of Levine et al. (2005) , then group membership is likely to determine one's attitude only-and one's helping. If, however, one can derive additional information about the other, this additional information may also affect one's evaluation of the person in need and, in turn, one's likelihood of helping. Even though, in the present paradigm, subjects did not know the ingroup and outgroup members, they were still able to form an impression by their mere presence in the same waiting and scanner room.
Most importantly, our study demonstrated that brain responses when seeing others' suffering pain predict actual helping behavior at a later point in time. Empathy-related activation in left AI predicted the frequency of later costly helping. The individual extent of a person's ingroup bias in left AI response was linked to the extent of ingroup favoritism in helping behavior. A refusal to help the outgroup member later on was predicted by the magnitude of individual NAcc activation in the participant when he saw the outgroup member suffering before. Commonality analyses showed that helping the ingroup member was best predicted by individual left AI responses and self-report measures on an empathy questionnaire, whereas NAcc activation, compared with self-report on a group-impression scale, was the best predictor of later behavior toward the outgroup member.
Taken together, our findings suggest that the decision to engage in or refrain from costly helping may result from the interplay between two competing motivational systems. Activation in AI when witnessing a person's suffering reflects empathybased motivation and increases people's propensity to help. In contrast, activation in NAcc, reflecting motivation counteracting empathy, is associated with letting the other person suffer. Which of the two systems is dominant in a concrete helping situation seemed to be determined by the evaluation of the suffering person. A positive evaluation elicited empathy-related AI activation, and a decrease in NAcc activation, resulting in a greater propensity to help. Such an interpretation is in line with recent behavioral evidence that showed a positive relationship between the evaluation of a person in need, empathic concern, and helping (Batson et al., 2007) . Complementarily, our results revealed that participants who rated the outgroup member negatively showed increased activation in NAcc and a reduction in empathy-related AI responses and, as a consequence, helped the outgroup member less. Overall, ingroup members were evaluated more positively than outgroup members, resulting in an ingroup bias in empathy-related AI responses and ingroup favoritism in helping. Interestingly, however, if the outgroup member was evaluated positively, his suffering also elicited an empathy-related AI response instead of NAcc activation, and he received help despite his outgroup membership. Emphasizing the immediate practical relevance of our findings, this implies that increasing empathy in people by, for example, providing them with more information about outgroup members can override their callousness toward the suffering of an outgroup member and reduce ingroup favoritism in helping behavior, with all its detrimental effects, in and across societies.
Complementing these findings, our study offers important methodological insights by comparing the contributions of brain measures and self-report measures to predicting ingroup and outgroup helping. The results of the commonality analyses showed that both brain responses and self-reports contribute to the prediction of interindividual differences in costly helping (11.7% for AI + Empathic Concern Scale; 17% for NAcc + Impression Scale). However, we also found sizable unique contributions (22.5% for the AI, 16.4% for the Empathic Concern Scale, 24.3% for the NAcc, and 10.2% for the Impression Scale), suggesting that brain responses in participants witnessing others' suffering and participants' self-reports capture different aspects of the motivation to help. Brain responses as compared with self-report measures are probably better indicators of participants' spontaneous, possibly unconscious, emotional responses. Accordingly, they should reflect a person's real motivations and be unbiased by social desirability effects (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995) , which are known to affect self-reports in socially sensitive situations such as when outgroup members are evaluated (Kawakami et al., 2009) . Supporting this view, the unique contribution of NAcc activation, as compared with self-reported impression of the outgroup member, was more powerful in predicting future helping behavior toward the outgroup member. This finding suggests that brain responses are particularly useful for predicting a person's behavior toward a nonpreferred other, such as an outgroup member. In contrast to brain responses, self-reports require that people reflect on their feelings and thoughts. Thus, they allow for more finegrained distinctions between different feelings and, according to our results, are reliable predictors of future helping behavior toward a preferred other, like an ingroup member.
In sum, our study identified two neurobiological processes associated with decisions to help or withdraw from prosocial behavior, and provides a neurobiologically informed account of ingroup favoritism in prosocial behavior. Furthermore, it demonstrates the reliability of imaging data in predicting later behavior, especially in socially sensitive situations such as when participants are helping an outgroup member.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants and Confederates Participants (16 men; mean age = 29.8, SE = 1.6), recruited from the fan club of a local soccer team, gave informed consent and the study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of Zurich (E-24/2008). We employed three male college students as confederates. They posed either as a fellow fan of the same football team (ingroup member) or a fan of the rival soccer team (outgroup member), counterbalanced across participants.
Prescanning Procedure Details about the cover story are provided in the Supplemental Information. After the competitive soccer quiz (see above), one of the outgroup confederates was sent away, ostensibly to take part in an EEG version of the experiment in another room, and the participant, the ingroup confederate, and the remaining outgroup confederate were taken to the scanner control room. There, we attached pain electrodes to the dorsum of their left hands. Following a standard procedure (Singer et al., 2004 (Singer et al., , 2006 , we determined individual thresholds for highly, moderately, and mildly painful sensation, using electrical stimulation (monopolar, monophasic, pulse width: 500 ms; frequency: 30 Hz; duration: 500 ms) from a custom-made stimulator (Compex; Keller et al., 2002) . The experimenter then explained that in the first experimental session all three of them would receive highly, moderately, or mildly painful stimulation. In the second experimental session, one of the three would not receive painful stimulation, but be able to decide whether to influence the painful stimulation of the others. The person who would not receive pain in the second session was to be determined by chance (viz., the person who drew the shortest match). Holding up three partially concealed matches, the experimenter made sure that the two confederates always drew first and selected the long matches, leaving the participant the short one.
Each of the three people had a separate visual display: the participant via back-projection from a mirror onto a screen; the two confederates outside the scanner via goggles. This assured that the participant's ratings and decisions were strictly anonymous. Finally, the three men were told that they would not meet after the experiment because the participant in the scanner would need to stay longer to complete an anatomical scan. The other two men would leave the building before the anatomical scan began.
Questionnaires

Impression Scale
The items assessed participants' awareness of the other's ingroup or outgroup membership (e.g., How similar to you do you think the person with the white/ red wristband is?; How much do you think you and this person have in common?; To what extent would you use the term ''we'' to describe yourself and this person?; To what extent do you see yourself and this person as part of the same group?), and their evaluation of the ingroup and the outgroup member (e.g., How much do you think you might like to interact with this person at some future time?; How likeable did you find this person?; Were you to meet this person, how likely do you think it is that you would become friends?; see Supplemental Appendix). The high internal consistency reliabilities (ingroup, Cronbach's a = 0.85; outgroup, Cronbach's a = 0.89) showed that the awareness of the other's group membership and personal evaluation of him were strongly correlated.
While completing the ingroup and outgroup Impression Scales, the participant was still sitting in the control room, separate from the confederates who were already seated in the scanning room.
Empathic Concern Scale
The scale assessed the extent to which participants experienced a certain affective state on a 7-point scale (e.g., How sympathetic, softhearted, warm, compassionate, tender, moved did you feel when you saw the person with the white/red wristband receiving highly painful shocks?; internal consistency reliability ingroup: Cronbach's a = 0.91, internal consistency reliability outgroup: Cronbach's a = 0.93; Supplemental Appendix). It is a subscale of a 20 item emotional response scale (Batson et al., 1997 for details) . The other subscale measuring Personal Distress was not used here, because our study focused on the relationship between empathy and helping, without a priori hypotheses for the impact of personal distress. However, we conducted complementary analyses with the Personal Distress scale (Table S5 ).
Scanning Procedure Session 1 Session 1 was based on a 3 3 3 factorial design, with the first factor representing ''intensity of pain stimulation'' (low, medium, high) and the second factor representing ''recipient'' (self, ingroup member, outgroup member). The scanning session consisted of 18 blocks with six stimuli: two high pain, two medium pain, and two low pain. One-third of these blocks included stimulation of the self (participant); one-third, stimulation of the ingroup member; and one-third, stimulation of the outgroup member. Block order and stimulus type were pseudorandomly permuted (repetitions of block type were limited to one, and stimulus type repetitions, to two). In total, there were 12 trials per condition. An example trial with timeline is shown in Figure 1A . Each block of pain stimulation was followed by an 8 s video with soccer scenes, representing the ''soccer part'' of the paradigm, consistent with the cover story (see Supplemental Information). All videos showed beneficial scenes for the local soccer team to keep the emotional valence constant and to boost participants' identification with their soccer team.
Session 2
The experimental setup (position of the confederates, pain electrodes) and the overall design of Session 2 were comparable to those of Session 1. The main difference was that now, only the ingroup or outgroup member received pain, and only two of the pain levels were used-high and low. The participant in the scanner did not receive stimulation, but was asked to choose between three decision options: (1) to help the ingroup or outgroup member by enduring half of the pain, (2) not to help and watch a soccer video, or (3) not to help and watch the other person endure the pain.
Session 2 consisted of 18 blocks with four stimuli each (two high pain, two low pain). Half of the blocks included stimulation of the ingroup member; half, of the outgroup member. Block order and stimulus type were pseudorandomly permuted (repetitions of block type were limited to one, and stimulus type repetitions to two). In total, there were 18 trials per condition. An example trial with timeline is shown in Figure 1B . Each block of pain stimulation was followed by an 8 s video with soccer scenes, beneficial for the participant's team.
If the participant chose the helping option, the pain bar display was shown for 1500 ms, with the participant's pain bar rising from the low to the medium level and the other's (ingroup or outgroup member's) pain bar dropping from the maximal to the medium level, followed by a flash and medium pain stimulation for the helper ( Figure 1B) . Helping was only possible in the high pain condition because it would have made no sense to take half of the other's low pain (i.e., not painful) stimulation. Low pain trials were included in Session 2 because we feared it would be irritating and implausible for the participant to see the others invariably facing highly painful shocks. However, the low pain condition was not included in the analyses. If the participant chose to watch a video instead of helping, a 6 s soccer video started with scenes favorable for the participant's favorite team. The participant knew that while he was watching soccer, the ingroup or outgroup member received the highly painful shock, which was indicated before in the pain bar display. If the participant opted to watch the pain of the ingroup or the outgroup member, the pain bar display appeared for 1500 ms, indicating again the level of stimulation the other was to receive, followed by the 1000 ms flash.
Not all decision options were used by all participants. This resulted in a large number of empty decision cells across participants, which would considerably reduce the statistical power of any imaging analyses. Taking this into account, and given that the focus of our study was to predict helping in the Session 2 from brain responses in the independent Session 1, we did not analyze the imaging data from Session 2.
Image Acquisition and Analysis
The experiment was conducted on a 3 Tesla Philips Intera whole-body MR Scanner (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) at the University Hospital Zurich, equipped with an 8-channel Philips SENSitivity Encoded (SENSE) head coil. Structural image acquisition consisted of 180 T1-weighted transversal images (0.75 mm slice thickness). For functional imaging, we used a SENSE (Pruessmann et al., 1999 ) T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging sequence with an acceleration factor of 2.0. We acquired 33 axial slices covering the whole brain with a slice thickness of 3.2 mm (interslice gap of 0.3 mm; descended acquisition; TR = 2000 ms; TE = 35 ms; flip angle = 82 , field of view = 220 mm; matrix size = 128 3 128). A total of 804 volumes were obtained in Session 1; in Session 2, 616 to 684 volumes were obtained, depending on the choices made by the participants (e.g., trials in which participants chose the Watch Video option were longer than Helping trials). The images were analyzed with SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK), using an event-related model (Josephs et al., 1997) . To correct for head movements, all functional volumes were realigned to the first volume (Friston et al., 2009 ) spatially normalized to a standard template with a resampled voxel size of 3 3 3 3 3 mm, and smoothed using a Gaussian kernel with a full width at half maximum (FWHM) of 10 mm (6 mm at the first level, 8 mm at the second level). To remove low-frequency drifts from the data, high-pass temporal filtering with a cut-off of 128 s was applied. After preprocessing, statistical analysis was carried out using the general linear model (Friston et al., 1995) . Regressors of interest were modeled using a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) with time derivative, the latter accounting for subject-to-subject and voxel-to-voxel variation in the response peak (Henson et al., 2002) . We defined separate regressors from each trial onset (presentation of the anticipatory cue) to the offset of the pain bars, covering a time window of 2000 ms, and for each pain onset (presentation of the flash) to pain offset, covering a time window of 1000 ms. Residual effects of head motion were corrected for by including the six estimated motion parameters for each subject as regressor of no interest in the design matrix. Contrast images were calculated by applying appropriate linear contrasts to the parameter estimates for the regressor of each event. For whole-brain analyses (see Supplemental Information) these contrast images were entered into one-sample t tests across the 16 participants to initiate random effect group analyses (Penny and Holmes, 2004) .
ROI Analyses
In our main analyses, we used an ROI approach. Using the Marsbar toolbox (Brett et al., 2009) , independent ROIs were defined in nine brain regions, based on activations (p uncorrected < 0.001) from a meta-analysis of previous studies with similar empathy-for-pain paradigms (Bird et al., 2009; Singer et al., 2006 Singer et al., , 2008 (Table S5 ). Moreover, we defined ROIs in bilateral NAcc based on three different independent previous studies: (1) Knutson et al. (2008) with 10 12 À2 and À10 12 À2 as center coordinates (8 mm diametrical spheres), (2) Singer et al. (2006) with À9 15 À9 as center coordinate (from the original activation map) and its mirror image with center coordinate 9 15 À9, and (3) Takahashi et al. (2009) with 8 mm diametrical spheres around the center coordinate reported in the paper (À14 2 À12) and its mirror image (center coordinate 14 2 À12).We extracted individual beta values, averaged over all voxels of the ROIs. Correlation results are reported with a significance level of p < 0.05.
Commonality Analysis
We conducted commonality analyses (Nimon et al., 2008) to assess the unique and common variance contributions of the brain and self-report measures considered in our study to the prediction of helping behavior. We included four predictor variables for ingroup helping and four predictor variables for outgroup helping; predictor 1 = each participant's beta values in left AI when seeing high -low ingroup/outgroup pain, predictor 2 = each participant's beta values in right NAcc when seeing high -low ingroup/outgroup pain, predictor 3 = each participant's mean score for the ingroup/outgroup member on the Empathic Concern Scale (Batson et al., 1997) , and predictor 4 = each participant's mean score for the ingroup/outgroup member on the Impression Scale (Batson et al., 1988) . In a first step, R-squared coefficients were calculated for the correlation of ingroup/outgroup helping with each predictor, and all possible combinations of predictors. The results are presented in Table S6 .
In a second step, we conducted two commonality analyses, one including all R-square values of ingroup-related predictors of ingroup helping, and one with all R-square values of outgroup-related predictors of outgroup helping. Using Equation 1 below, we computed the unique (U) and common (C) variance contribution of the predictors to the total explained variance of ingroup and outgroup helping: The results are reported in Table 1 . Note that negative commonalities probably reflect suppression effects, or occur when some of the correlations among predictors are positive and others are negative (Pedhazur, 1997) . However, given that none of the negative variance contributions reached significance, we refrain from interpreting them.
In a third step, we tested the significance of the observed variance contributions against a random baseline (Horn, 1965) . As the random baseline we used the mean of the variance contributions from 5000 commonality analyses, computed with 5000 random permutations of each of the four ingroup/outgroup predictors (see Figure S3) .
In a fourth step, we used a bootstrapping procedure to statistically test for differences between variance contributions, which, in step three, were significant on the 90% level (see Figure S3 ). We created 5000 pseudosamples with 16 subjects each, by sampling with replacement from our original sample. Each bootstrap pseudosample was submitted to the commonality analysis described above, and the differences between the respective variance components were calculated. The significance of these differences was tested with symmetric basic bootstrap confidence intervals (Davison and Hinkley, 1997) . We corrected for multiple comparisons using a stepwise multiple testing procedure (Romano and Wolf, 2005) . In short, we computed the distribution of the maximum differences between the individual conditions and used the value corresponding to the 95% confidence interval.
Whole-Brain Analyses of Main Effects, Parametric Pain Modulation, Conjunction Analyses
The results of the whole-brain analyses are reported in Tables S1 to S4. All whole-brain results are reported with a threshold of p uncorrected < 0.001. Activations that were also significant at p < 0.05 FDR correction are marked correspondingly. The anatomical localizations of the functional activations were identified using an anatomical atlas (Duvernoy, 1999) and probabilistic cytoarchitectonical maps (Eickhoff et al., 2007) implemented in the SPM toolbox. Subregions in cingulate cortex were classified based on a recent review of cingulate cytoarchitecture and functions (Vogt, 2005) . Analyses contain (1) the contrast between high and low self pain (high -low self pain) and the parametrical modulation by high, medium, and low pain stimuli (Table S1 ), (2) conjunction analyses, equivalent to a masking procedure (Friston et al., 2005) , for high -low pain trials in self and others, pooled across the ingroup and outgroup conditions (Table S2A) , and done so separately for high -low self pain trials and high -low ingroup pain trials (Table S2B) and high -low self pain trials and high -low outgroup pain trials (Table S2C) , (3) the contrast between observing high and low pain in the ingroup member and observing high and low pain in the outgroup member (high -low ingroup pain versus high -low outgroup pain) (Table S3A) , the contrast between observing high and low pain in the ingroup member (high -low ingroup pain) (Table S3B) , and the contrast between observing high and low pain in the outgroup member (high -low outgroup pain) (Table S3C) , and (4) the contrast between observing high and low pain pooled across ingroup and outgroup conditions ([high -low ingroup pain] and [high -low outgroup pain]) (Table S4 ).
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